Difference between revisions of "Reputation and Reliability in Collective Goods the Case of the Online Encyclopedia Wikipedia"
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| − | '''Reputation and Reliability in Collective Goods the Case of the Online Encyclopedia Wikipedia''' - scientific work related to Wikipedia quality published in 2009, written by Denise L. Anthony, Sean W. Smith and Timothy Williamson. | + | '''Reputation and Reliability in Collective Goods the Case of the Online Encyclopedia Wikipedia''' - scientific work related to [[Wikipedia quality]] published in 2009, written by [[Denise L. Anthony]], [[Sean W. Smith]] and [[Timothy Williamson]]. |
== Overview == | == Overview == | ||
| − | An important organizational innovation enabled by the revolution in information technologies is `open source' production which converts private commodities into essentially public goods. Similar to other public goods, incentives for reputation and group identity appear to motivate contributions to open source projects, overcoming the social dilemma inherent in producing such goods. In this paper authors examine how contributor motivations affect the type of contributions made to the open source online encyclopedia Wikipedia . As expected, authors find that registered participants, motivated by reputation and commitment to the Wikipedia community, make many contributions with high reliability. Surprisingly, however, authors find the highest reliability from the vast numbers of anonymous `Good Samaritans' who contribute only once. Authors findings of high reliability in the contributions of both Good Samaritans and committed `zealots' suggest that open source production succeeds by altering the scope of production such that a critical mass of contributors can participate. | + | An important organizational innovation enabled by the revolution in information technologies is `[[open source]]' production which converts private commodities into essentially public goods. Similar to other public goods, incentives for [[reputation]] and group identity appear to motivate contributions to open source projects, overcoming the social dilemma inherent in producing such goods. In this paper authors examine how contributor motivations affect the type of contributions made to the open source online encyclopedia [[Wikipedia]] . As expected, authors find that registered participants, motivated by reputation and commitment to the [[Wikipedia community]], make many contributions with high [[reliability]]. Surprisingly, however, authors find the highest reliability from the vast numbers of anonymous `Good Samaritans' who contribute only once. Authors findings of high reliability in the contributions of both Good Samaritans and committed `zealots' suggest that open source production succeeds by altering the scope of production such that a critical mass of contributors can participate. |
Revision as of 08:55, 5 June 2019
Reputation and Reliability in Collective Goods the Case of the Online Encyclopedia Wikipedia - scientific work related to Wikipedia quality published in 2009, written by Denise L. Anthony, Sean W. Smith and Timothy Williamson.
Overview
An important organizational innovation enabled by the revolution in information technologies is `open source' production which converts private commodities into essentially public goods. Similar to other public goods, incentives for reputation and group identity appear to motivate contributions to open source projects, overcoming the social dilemma inherent in producing such goods. In this paper authors examine how contributor motivations affect the type of contributions made to the open source online encyclopedia Wikipedia . As expected, authors find that registered participants, motivated by reputation and commitment to the Wikipedia community, make many contributions with high reliability. Surprisingly, however, authors find the highest reliability from the vast numbers of anonymous `Good Samaritans' who contribute only once. Authors findings of high reliability in the contributions of both Good Samaritans and committed `zealots' suggest that open source production succeeds by altering the scope of production such that a critical mass of contributors can participate.
